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1The acne drug Accutane is one of the most dangerous products on the market today. The drug causes
serious side-eﬀects, most notably birth defects. Accutane is also one of the most eﬀective prescription drugs
available. This combination—unique eﬃcacy coupled with unique risk—has posed a serious challenge for
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Over the past two decades, FDA has grappled with how manage
the completely preventable but persistently serious problem of Accutane-induced birth defects. On several
occasions, the product spurred FDA to take unprecedented regulatory action.
In 1975 when American researchers for Hoﬀmann-La Roche began studying the chemical, isotretinoin, they were
struck by its remarkable eﬀectiveness.1 The drug, which Roche Laboratories sells as Accutane, is an extremely
powerful antidote to acne, unmatched by any other treatment. 85% of patients who take Accutane achieve full
remission after a typical course of treatment (about ﬁve months).2 Because of its exceptional power to cure
acne, Accutane has been praised as a “miracle drug.”3 Just last year, FDA Consumer Magazine—FDA’s own
magazine—pronounced the drug “the biggest breakthrough in acne drug treatment over the last 20 years.”4
This may seem like undue attention for a simple pimple remedy, but in actuality severe acne can be a seriously
debilitating condition. A recent article in the Archives of Family Medicine noted, “Although acne is not a life-
threatening disease, it has signiﬁcant physical and psychological ramiﬁcations such as permanent scarring, poor
self-image, social inhibition, depression and anxiety.”5 The type of acne indicated for Accutane treatment—severe
recalcitrant cystic acne—is an extremely disﬁguring condition caused by a chronic oil and gland disorder. Much
more than the familiar blackheads, the condition is marked by tremendous pus ﬁlled lesions which typically spread
1Accutane and Pregnancy, Wash. Post, Apr. 26, 1988 at A17.
2Robert S. Stern, A Uniquely Eﬀective Drug Is Teratogenic: The Case of Isotretinoin, 320 New Eng. J. Med 1007 (1989).
3See e.g. Jennifer Frey, For the Stupaks, ’Miracle’ Drug Casts a Light on Son’s Suicide, Wash. Post, Jan. 19, 2001, at C1.
4Michelle Meadows, The Power of Accutane, FDA Consumer, Mar. 1, 2001, at 18.
5Diane Thiboutot, New Treatments and Therapeutic Strategies for Acne, 9 Arch. Fam. Med 179, 179-180 (2000).
2across the entire face and neck leaving behind pitted scars. One FDA oﬃcial noted that the cysts can be so
cosmetically crippling that people cannot get jobs.6 A patient described in the Journal of the American Medical
Association (JAMA) became so displeased by his appearance that he dropped out of college.7 According to
Jennifer Hansen, a 21 year-old taking Accutane who keeps an online Accutane journal, This medicine has given
me my life back.... I am now conﬁdent, happy and very excited about life. I no longer feel inferior and can actually
look people in the eyes.8
Since its release, Accutane has provided tremendous revenue to its marketer, Roche; the drug brings in over
$700 million a year for the Swiss company’s prescription drug unit, Hoﬀmann-La Roche. About 12 million people
worldwide (including 5 million Americans) have taken Accutane, which is called Roaccutane outside the United
States.9 In 2000, Accutane sales totaled $759.4 million—8% of total prescription drug sales.10
But as productive as it is, both as a money-maker and a therapy, Accutane also has the potential to destroy lives.
Accutane is an extremely dangerous teratogen: it can cause severe birth defects when taken during pregnancy.
About one quarter of babies born who have been exposed to Accutane during gestation have major congenital
deformities. Those babies born without major malformations frequently develop severe learning disabilities. A
whole segment of Accutane babies do not even survive pregnancy: 40% are spontaneously miscarried. Dr. Edward
Lammer, a medical geneticist and consultant to FDA, describes the overall risk posed by Accutane:
This is an extraordinarily high absolute risk, really comparable, in terms of environmental expo-
sures, only to Thalidomide or certain congenital infections. There is no other medication that
poses an absolute risk anything remotely close to this, even medications used to treat cancer
during pregnancy.11
6Cristine Russell, FDA Steps Up Warnings to Doctors, Blood Banks on Risks of Acne Drug, Wash. Post, Mar. 30, 1984, at A1
(quoting Dr. Carnot Evans, an FDA medical oﬃcer).
7Acne Drug Depression Warnings Highlight Need for Expert Care, 279 JAMA 1057 (1998).
8Jennifer Hansen, Jenn’s Accutane Journal, (2002) at http://jmhpr.tripod.com/accutanediary/index.html. There is no indication
that Jennifer Hansen is aﬃliated with Roche’s pharmaceutical company, Hoﬀmann-La Roche. The very fact that this young adult
keeps a journal dedicated to her experiences with Accutane—and posts it on the internet—testiﬁes to the power of the drug.
9Mary Duenwald, After 20 Years, Debate Over Drug Persists, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 2002 at F7.
10Roche’s U.S. Patent for Accutane Expires, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 2002, at B9.
3According to Dr. Lammer, brain abnormalities are the most typical problem for Accutane babies, even babies
who appear normal at birth (i.e. babies not counted in the 25%). In addition, Accutane commonly inhibits the
development of the bones and cartilage of the face. Children may be born with no ears at all; sometimes there
are small slits in the place of ears. Heart defects, which often grow fatal, characterize the third most common
problem described by Dr. Lammer.12 Many of the Accutane babies who do not suﬀer from congenital deformity
have abnormally low IQ scores.13
Since its approval in 1982, references to Accutane have peppered the pages of law reviews and other publications.
The drug has become an example for academics and others proposing reform.14 The popular media also have
related the problem of Accutane babies episodically through the19 years since Accutane-induced birth defects ﬁrst
appeared in 1983. But none of these accounts has oﬀered a full history of Accutane in the U.S.
This paper takes a journalistic approach, tracing the chronology of Accutane in the U.S. in order to ﬁll in the
gaps of the story that has inspired so much controversy. Accutane has repeatedly pushed the frontier of FDA
regulation, as the agency struggled to adapt its tools to meet the challenge of an extremely eﬀective and extremely
dangerous medication. By emphasizing the evolving American response to the high level of risk associated with
Accutane, I hope to provide the material needed to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of our current regulatory
framework.
Discovery and Pre-Market Approval: 1970-1982
Perhaps the biggest challenge in chronicling Accutane has been to decipher the early history
12Id.
13Testimony of Dr. Jane Adams before the Dermatologic Drugs Advisory Committee, Sep. 18 2000, available at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/00/transcripts/3639t1a.pdf.
14See e.g. Joan H. Krause, Accutane: Has Drug Regulation in The United States Reached Its Limits?, 6 J. L. & Health 1 (1992);
Barry R. Furrow, Enterprise Liability for Bad Outcomes from Drug Therapy: the Doctor, the Hospital, the Pharmacy, and the Drug
Firm, Drake L. Rev 377 (1996).
4of the drug. Most of the information about Accutane’s development, testing and approval
only began to emerge ten years after the drug reached the market. Creating a narrative has
required piecing together fragments of the puzzle which surfaced over the course of the past
decade.
One might blame Roche: the company has repeatedly gone to court demanding that material describing
the development of Accutane be kept private.15 Of course, all manufacturers have the right to maintain
conﬁdentiality of trade secrets. But some believe that the Roche exploits that authority in order to keep
certain details—details which might reﬂect poorly on the company—obscured.16 Questions about Roche’s
disclosure practices recur throughout for the Accutane story.
Dr. Werner Bollag ﬁrst studied the chemical compound, 13-cis retinoic acid at Roche laboratories in Switzer-
land during the 1960s. Bollag tested the compound as a treatment for skin cancer, and in 1971, discovered
the drug’s ability to cure acne. But Bollag also realized that the drug could cause serious birth defects. The
compound derived from vitamin A, a known teratogen. When it proved ineﬀective as a cancer therapy he
abandoned the project. In a frequently quoted article from Retinoids Therapy, Bollag explained, “At that
time [the 1970s], in the psychological climate engendered by the thalidomide tragedy, it would be incon-
ceivable to develop an agent with teratogenic properties for the treatment of such a common complaint as
acne.”17
In 1975, two scientists at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) started testing Hoﬀmann-La Roche’s 13-cis
15Hoﬀmann-La Roche v. Yoder, 950 F. Supp. 1348 (Ohio 1997); Hammock v. Hoﬀmann-La Roche, 622 A.2d 546 (N.J. 1996).
16The searches conducted by Frank Yoder, Mark Somerson, and the advocacy group Public Citizen are discussed below.
17Quoted in Diane Nygaard, Accutane: Is the Drug a Prescription for Birth Defects, Trial, Dec. 1988 at 81; Krause supra note 14,
at 7.
5retinoic acid (then known as isotretinoin) as a treatment for a severe skin disorder called lamellar ichthyosis.
In their research, Drs. Frank Yoder and Gary Peck accidentally discovered that the chemical also cleared up
acne. Subjects who had been covered with pimples returned to the oﬃce with clear skin.18 On November
27, 1976 Yoder and Peck published their ﬁndings in the British medical Journal, Lancet.19 According to the
two doctors, Hoﬀmann-La Roche never informed them of Werner Bollag’s work. “I didn’t know about the
1971 studies until 1986,” Peck later told the Columbus Dispatch, “My ﬁrst reaction was that I wasn’t sure
that I believed it in the ﬁrst place.”20 For years, Yoder and Peck believed that they were the ﬁrst to discover
the isotretinoin as an acne cure.
Isotretinoin became Accutane, and in clinical trials researchers carefully avoided exposing pregnant women
to the drug. Hoﬀmann-La Roche had conducted animal studies, and oﬀspring of subjects showed facial
deformities much like the ones that have subsequently been seen in Accutane babies.21 Most test centers
excluded women. Those researchers who did include women in trials required a negative pregnancy test
and contraceptive use. In an aﬃdavit, David Benjamin who monitored the clinical trials in 1977 and 1978
explained, “I felt that the risk of giving birth to a deformed child... was so great as to make it ethically
improper and scientiﬁcally foolish to give Accutane to women who were not using an eﬀective form of contra-
ception.” According to Benjamin, one woman involved in a clinical trial became pregnant, and the company
urged her to have an abortion.22 When Roche submitted Accutane for FDA approval in July of 1981, the
company reported that no human babies had been exposed to the drug.
FDA referred the application to the Dermatologic Drugs Advisory Committee, one of many panels of outside
experts who provide FDA with independent recommendations about drug applications and other FDA poli-
18Mark D. Somerson, Swiss Researcher Never Published Acne Drug Studies, Columbus Dispatch, May 1, 1996, at 2C.
19Gary L. Peck and Frank W. Yoder, Treatment of Lamellar Ichthyosis and Other Keratinizing Dermatoses with an Oral Synthetic
Retinoid, 2 Lancet 1172 (1976).
20Somerson supra note 18.
21Nygaard supra note 17at 81 (citing FDA’s, Summary Basis of Approval, NDA 18-662, Jan. 15, 1982).
22Mark D. Somerson and Jill Riepenhoﬀ, Patient was Urged to Get an Abortion; Researcher Feared Defects in Accutane User’s
Baby, Columbus Dispatch, Apr. 8, 1996 at 1C (quoting Benjamin’s 1994 aﬀadavit for Fetterolf v. Hoﬀmann-La Roche, 651 N.E.2d
1309, (Ohio 1995)).
6cies. FDA provides administrative support to the Dermatologic Drugs Advisory Committee, which includes
several dermatologists, other medical experts and a consumer representative. FDA generally follows advisory
committees’ recommendations, though they are not binding.23
In January 1982 the Dermatologic Drugs Advisory Committee suggested FDA approve Accutane. But the
Committee also urged that the label be revised. In its application for Accutane, Roche had written “Terato-
genicity was observed in rats at a... dose of 150 mg/day. In rabbits, a dose of 10 mg/day was teratogenic...
and induced abortions. There are no adequate and well-controlled studies in pregnant women.”24 Roche
suggested a pregnancy risk rating of C. There are ﬁve risk categories: A, B, C, D and X, and a rating of
C indicates that “studies in animals have revealed adverse eﬀects of the fetus and there are no controlled
studies in women.... Drugs should be given only if the potential beneﬁt justiﬁes the potential risk to the
fetus.” FDA insisted that Roche upgrade the warning for Accutane and classiﬁed it as category X, which
indicates that the risk to fetus clearly outweighs any possible beneﬁt from using the drug during pregnancy.
25
Clearly, the absence of human birth defects was the direct result of Hoﬀmann-La Roche’s testing conditions:
all female participants were given pregnancy tests and contraceptives, and the one woman who did become
pregnant aborted. Although FDA heightened the pregnancy risk rating for the drug, the original label did
not suggest the careful precautions that Roche itself had used during clinical trials. Instead, the label noted
the fact that there had been no evidence of birth defects in humans.26
In May 1982, nine months after the application had been submitted, FDA announced approval of Accutane.
23Information about FDA’s advisory committees is available at the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research website, at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/audiences/acspage/index.htm.
24Quoted in Jill Riepenhoﬀ and Mark D. Somerson, Company Soft-Pedaled Accutane Tie to Birth Defects in 1982, Columbus
Dispatch, May 19, 1996 at 2D.
25Testimony of Dr. Colonel Evans before the Dermatologic Drugs Advisory Committee, 37 (May 8, 1989) available at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/accutane/29t1.pdf.
26Quoted in Krause supra note 14, at 17.
7The drug had been classiﬁed “1A,” top priority, and awarded fast track approval. According to a Hoﬀmann-
La Roche spokeswoman quoted in the Washington Post, Approval came through so fast that it came as quite
a surprise to everyone...” Caught oﬀ guard, Hoﬀmann-La Roche took an extra four months preparing to
launch the drug. The United States was the ﬁrst country to approve Accutane.27
Early Marketing: 1984-1987
In September 1982, Accutane arrived to a warm welcome. “There has never been a drug like it” Newsweek
reported.28 U.S. News and World Reports stated that Accutane could clear up most cases of acne within a
few months.29 During the ﬁrst six months of marketing, doctors wrote 200,000 prescriptions for Accutane—
many more than even Hoﬀmann-La Roche had expected.30
At the same time, some of the doctors who had studied the drug began to voice alarm. Dr. Henry J.
Roenigk had been chairman of the dermatology department at Northwestern University and participated as
a researcher for Roche during clinical trials. In May 1982—just as FDA granted approval—Roenigk pub-
lished an article in the Journal of Dermatology about Accutane’s potential to cause birth defects.31 Dr.
Frank Yoder, one of the two NIH scientists who had seemingly discovered the acne remedy, wrote a letter
to JAMA in January 1983. ”I wish to express my concern and anxiety over the potential tragedy that
might arise from abuse and misuse of Accutane.... The potential toxicity of this drug has been seriously
27Penny Chorlton, FDA Outpaced Firm on Acne Drug, The Wash. Post, Sept. 14, 1982 at A17.
28Matt Clark, Now a Real Cure for Acne, Newsweek, Sep. 13 1982, at 56 (quoting Dr.. Eugene Farber, chief of dermatology at
Stanford University School of Medicine).
29Remedy for Acne, U.S. News and World Report, Oct. 11, 1982 at. 83.
30Riepenhoﬀ and Somerson, supra note 24.
31Quoted in Mark D. Somerson and Jill Riepenhoﬀ, Drug Had A Reputation in Europe, Doctor Recalls, Columbus Dispatch, Apr.
27, 1996 at 1C.
8under-emphasized.”32
Hoﬀmann-La Roche reproached the scientists for releasing information obtained while working for the com-
pany. Yoder claims that he received a hostile phone call from Roche executives. According to him, Roche
representatives ”angrily told me I should not be writing that sort of conﬁdential information. I didn’t agree
with them. I thought the public good must be served.” (Roche has not conﬁrmed this account.) Shortly
afterward the company sent letters to all scientists who had participated in clinical trials, stressing the con-
ﬁdentiality of information obtained during research sponsored by Hoﬀmann-La Roche. In a 1996 court case,
a Roche employee testiﬁed, “’An investigator had written an article, and we wanted to re-emphasize to all
investigators that the information they received was conﬁdential.”33
Within a few months, Hoﬀmann-La Roche began receiving stories about of babies born with severe birth de-
fects to women who had taken Accutane. In June 1983—nine months after the drug had been released—three
cases were reported to Roche.34 The Company quickly sent out a “Dear Doctor” letter, warning against the
dangers of using Accutane during pregnancy.35 That August, FDA published an article in Lancet describ-
ing 12 reported cases of “adverse pregnancy outcomes” attributed to Accutane.36 Roche distributed red
warning stickers to pharmacies for Accutane containers and mailed a second Dear Doctor letter to 500,000
physicians. The company also revised the drug label to include more information about birth defects and a
more prominently placed warning.37
In September 1983, the advocacy organization Public Citizen petitioned FDA to further adjust the Accu-
32Frank W. Yoder, Isotretinoin: A Word of Caution, 249 JAMA 350 (1983).
33Quoted in Mark D. Somerson and Jill Riepenhoﬀ, Doctor Defends his Articles, Columbus Dispatch, Apr. 26 1996 at 1A.
34Pregnant Women Given Warning on Acne Drug, N.Y. Times, Jul. 26, 1983, at A12.
35Accutane and Pregnancy, supra note 1.
36Franz W. Rosa, Teratogenicity of Isotretinoin, Lancet 513 (1983).
37Testimony of Dr. Jonathon Wilkin before the Dermatologic Drugs Advisory Committee, 37 (Sep.18 2000), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/00/transcripts/3639t1a.pdf.
9tane label. Public Citizen’s Health Research Group claimed that the drug’s warnings were inadequate and
consequently Accutane had been over-prescribed. The group demanded a boxed warning describing the pos-
sibility of birth defects, spontaneous abortions, Chrohn’s disease and several other serious health problems.
In addition, Public Citizen asked FDA to require patient package inserts explaining the possible side-eﬀects
in non-technical language. FDA declined Public Citizen’s requests. 38
In the ﬁrst 18 months of marketing, about 400,000 patients took Accutane. By March 1984, Roche col-
lected reports of 20 Accutane babies.39 The Dermatologic Drugs Advisory Committee convened a meeting
to address the problem.
On the Committee’s recommendation, FDA had Roche further strengthen Accutane’s warning about birth
defects. The label explicitly suggested that patients use contraceptives beginning a month before therapy.
Roche also took out a “Medical Director’s Page” in JAMA to inform doctors who might prescribe the
drug. In addition, FDA advised blood banks to refuse donations from Accutane users. Although mild
by today’s standards, these controls were deemed “unprecedented regulatory action” by FDA spokesman
William Grigg.40
Between 1984 and 1988 Roche delivered seven more Dear Doctor letters warning about Accutane.41 In June
1985, FDA and Roche again upgraded the caution on the label, this time including a boxed warning as
Public Citizen had requested in 1983.42 At that time, the boxed warning was the most serious directive that
FDA employed, short of recall. Practitioners have suggested that FDA requires a black box warning when it
38Larry Sasich, HRG Publication #1537, available at http://www.publiccitizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=4899.
39Cristine Russell supra note 6.
40Id.
41Jonathon Wilkin, supra note 37 at 36.
42Larry Sasich, supra note 38.
10hopes to decrease sales of a drug.43 But in the years following the revision, Accutane prescriptions remained
common and reports of severely deformed babies continued to surface.44
Surviving the Risk of Recall: 1988-1995
In a private memo dated February 11, 1988 several scientists at FDA’s Division of Epidemiology urged the
agency to actively consider taking Accutane oﬀ the market. “All eﬀorts to date have been unsuccessful at
protecting against pregnancy exposure and the sequalae of birth defects and abortion.” Based on studies of
Michigan Medicaid patients, the authors, Drs. David Graham, Franz Rosa and Carlene Baum, estimated
900 to 1300 Accutane babies had been born in the U.S.45 FDA had received reports of only 62 deformed
babies.46 In March, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) released a report describing four New Jersey cases
of multiple serious birth defects in babies exposed to Accutane before birth.47 FDA scheduled a meeting of
the Dermatologic Drugs Advisory Committee for the end of April.
On April 22, four days before the scheduled meeting, an account of the conﬁdential FDA memo appeared on
the front page of the New York Times.48 Someone had leaked the document. News of the large estimated
number of Accutane babies—combined with the large number of abortions suggested to have been caused by
the drug—sparked a craze of media attention. Journalists questioned whether the manufacturer and doctors
had pushed the drug too far and whether FDA had approved the drug too quickly.49 New York Represen-
43Raymond G. Mullady, Everything You Needed and Wanted to Know About Black Boxed Warnings, 68 Def. Couns. J. 50, 54
(2001).
44See e.g. Edward Lammer et. al, Retinoic Acid Embryopathy, 313 New Eng. J. Med. 837 (1985).
45Gina Kolata, Anti-Acne Drug Faulted in Birth Defects, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1988, at A1.
46Krause, supra note 14, at 20.
47Accutane and Pregnancy, supra note 1.
48Kolata, supra note 45.
49See e.g. Philip J. Hilts and Susan Okie, Accutane: Recklessness or Reasonable Risk?, Wash. Post, Apr. 26, 1988, at A17.
11tative Ted Weiss publicly called on FDA to limit access to the drug. Weiss also questioned the agency’s
response, Why does the FDA proceed merely to schedule another advisory committee meeting?... We must
not allow the advisory committee process to be used as an excuse to permit such a seriously birth-deforming
drug to remain on the market. 50 A day later, Hoﬀmann-La Roche chimed in, indicting the Michigan study
as “essentially meaningless” and calling the ﬁgures “grossly overstated.”51 The company argued that the
data had been obtained from too small a sample size for extrapolation and had been misinterpreted by FDA.
Dr. Frank Yoder, by now no friend to Hoﬀmann-La Roche, gave a statement to the Washington Post, calling
the company “negligent and wrong” for over-promoting the drug to doctors who were not dermatologists.
Yoder also described the ﬁrm safeguards that had been in place during testing to ensure that no pregnant
women were exposed to the drug. “It is incredible to require that in a study but not in a mass market
situation.... This was very, very wrong.” Hoﬀmann-La Roche oﬃcials “angrily dismissed” Yoder’s charges.52
One source of controversy was the disparity between Accutane use in the U.S. and that in other countries.
As of April 30, 1988 only three Accutane babies had been born in Europe.53 A dermatologist in England
commented, “The U.S. experience is one which horriﬁes us.”54 Most countries in Europe strictly limited
access to the drug. In Switzerland, doctors had to register with the government to prescribe it. In the United
Kingdom, only 350 dermatologist had authority to prescribe Accutane and only hospitals could dispense it.
As a prerequisite to receiving the drug in Britain, a woman had to stipulate that she would be willing to have
an abortion. Sweden never approved Accutane for general use; dermatologists applied for special permission
when a patient had a particular need. In Spain, the Ministry of Health kept the name and address of every
woman taking Accutane in a special registry. The European approach to Accutane reﬂected not just a
diﬀerent regulatory methodology, but also diﬀering circumstances. In the wake of Thalidomide, Europeans
50Quoted in Michael Abramowitz and Philip J. Hilts, FDA Eyes Ban on Acne Drug, Wash. Post, Apr. 23, 1988, at A1.
51Phillip M. Boﬀey, Maker of Drug for Acne Calls Birth-Defect Report “Invalid,” N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1988, § 1, at 1.
52Abramowitz and Hilts, supra note 50.
53Linda Amster, Saturday News Quiz, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1988, § 1, at 14.
54Quoted in Gina Kolata, Europeans Placed Stiﬀer Curbs on Acne Drug, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1988, at A1.
12treated all teratogenic drugs extremely cautiously. According to the British dermatologist quoted above,
“As a group of doctors who lived through Thalidomide, we are much more careful about using Accutane.”55
Advocates such as Public Citizen pointed to the low number of Accutane-related birth defects abroad as
evidence of the need for restricted access.56
The Committee meeting on April 26th was just as contentious as the public debate that preceded it.57
One spectator remarked that the doctors had clearly divided into two camps: the dermatologists versus
the pediatricians.58 Everyone agreed that Accutane caused birth defects, but the dermatologists asserted
that because it was so eﬀective, and because treatment could be limited to a few months, the drug should
remain on the market. Hoﬀmann-La Roche proposed an aggressive education program to reduce the risk
of pregnancy. CDC’s Dr. J. David Erickson rejected this tactic, “the current approach... has failed.” He
suggested the drug be dispensed only at a limited number of regional centers. Others from the Division of
Epidemiology presented evidence that the drug was “markedly overprescribed.”59 Ultimately, the Commit-
tee voted 4-to-3 to keep Accutane on the market but with restricted access. The Committee recommended
that only a limited number of certiﬁed physicians be permitted to dispense the drug. In addition, women at
high-risk of pregnancy would be required to procure a second opinion before receiving Accutane.60
A month later, FDA announced that it would not follow the Committee’s recommendation to restrict access
to Accutane. Questioning whether it had the authority to dictate who could prescribe the drug, FDA in-
stead mandated new warnings for the label. The agency required that Hoﬀmann-La Roche provide informed
consent forms to be signed by patients and doctors. In addition the FDA directed the company to double the
type size in the warning; include a picture of a baby deformed by Accutane in the material going to patients;
55Id.
56Larry Sasich, supra note 38.
57Transcripts available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/accutane.htm.
58James L. Mills, Protecting the Embryo from X-Rated Drugs, 333 New. Engl. J. Med. 124, (1995).
59Transcripts from the Dermatologic Drugs Advisory Committee, Apr. 26, 1989, available at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/accutane.htm.
60Michael Abramowitz, FDA Advised to Limit Accutane Prescriptions, Wash. Post, Apr. 27, 1988, at A1.
13dispense the drug in a blister-pack with warnings on every package; instruct doctors that they should give
both written and oral warnings; add a symbol of a pregnant woman crossed out on the material given to
doctors and patients; and conduct follow-up studies to determine the eﬃcacy of the new program.61 Again,
Accutane had pushed FDA to “an extraordinary new measure,” one which the agency itself described as
“unprecedented,”62 and “a very dramatic and innovative approach.”63
Hoﬀmann-La Roche announced that it would comply with FDA’s requirements. In addition, the company
oﬀered to pay the costs of contraceptive counseling and pregnancy testing for any woman receiving a prescrip-
tion of Accutane.64 Taken together Roche titled the new interventions its Pregnancy Prevention Program
and implemented the changes in October 1988. Researchers at the Slone Epidemiology Unit of the Boston
University School of Public Health were enlisted to study the eﬃcacy of the program as dictated by FDA.
Debates continued throughout 1989. On May 8, 1989, the Dermatologic Drugs Advisory Committee again
met to discuss Accutane. The group accepted comments from representatives of Teratology Society of Amer-
ica, the Association for Retarded Citizens of the U.S., the March of Dimes, the Accutane Litigation Group,
and the American Academy of Pediatrics among others. Dermatologists presented pictures of patients who
had suﬀered from extremely severe acne and had been cured by Accutane. Epidemiologists at CDC expressed
the “deep level of concern that we feel... about the ongoing very high rate of use.” Hours were spent arguing
over the numbers. Committee members agreed that it was too soon to evaluate Roche’s success in reducing
pregnancy–the Pregnancy Prevention Program was only six months old; FDA would continue to monitor
the situation. 65
61Described in the transcripts from the Dermatologic Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting, May 8, 1989, available at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/accutane.htm.
62Philip J. Hilts, Stong Birth-Defect Warnings to Be Required on Acne Drug, Wash. Post, May 27, 1988, at A1.
63Lawrence K. Altman, Strict Curb Urged on Drug Linked to Birth Defects, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1988, at A1.
64Id.
65Transcripts from the Dermatologic Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting, May 8, 1989, available at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/accutane.htm.
14In the fall a ﬁght broke out in the back pages of the New England Journal of Medicine. Robert Stern, a
dermatologist in Boston, had written an article describing Accutane as a uniquely eﬀective treatment for acne.
He also described the birth defects caused by the drug and outlined Roche’s new Pregnancy Prevention Program
remarking on “the substantial burden” placed on physicians. Stern concluded, “Our success in facing the
challenge of (Accutane) will be important in determining whether other [eﬀective drugs that cause birth defects]
become available and how they are used.”66 The September 14th issue of the New England Journal of Medicine
contained several irate responses to Stern’s piece. Sidney Wolfe and Andrew Holmes from Public Citizen
lambasted Stern for neglecting to disclose his “substantial association with Hoﬀmann-La Roche,” and suggested
that numbers taken from the Slone Study were inaccurate. Likewise, Drs. Gerald Faich and Franz Rosa argued
that there have probably been many more Accutane babies than have been reported. They lamented, It is
disappointing that little change has occurred in the rates of use of the drug in women, in spite of considerable
publicity eﬀorts to educate physicians.” Stern replied noting that the New England Journal of Medicine had
known of his connection to Roche (a fact veriﬁed by the editor-in-chief). He added, “I wrote the Sounding
Board article because politics and polemics rather than scientiﬁc inquiry were dominating the debate about
(Accutane).”67
Eight months later the Dermatologic Drugs Advisory Committee met with the Fertility and Maternal Health
Drugs Advisory Committee to discuss Accutane. FDA asked the two groups to address this question: had
the pre-1988 adverse public health situation changed in a meaningful way and to a meaningful extent? The
Committees found that it had not. The continued high level of Accutane use in the at risk population, prescriber
non-compliance with important components of the program (many reproductive-aged women had not even been
given a pregnancy test before starting therapy), and relatively low levels of participation in the Slone survey
posed signiﬁcant concerns for the group.68 But the advisory panels decided to give Hoﬀmann-La Roche another
seven months to prove the eﬃcacy of the Pregnancy Prevention Program.69
It actually took twelve months for the committees to reconvene—the joint meeting was held in May 1991—
and by the time the groups came together, the media spotlight had disappeared. Unlike the previous three
Accutane-related meetings, this one received no coverage in the Washington Post or the New York Times. Also
in contrast to the earlier meetings, this one found that Hoﬀmann-La Roche’s interventions achieved results.
Committee members heard data from the Slone study indicating that number of fertile women taking Accutane
had declined. The Slone study suggested a pregnancy rate of 3.6 per 1000 women who used Accutane. And of
those women who did become pregnant, 28% reported having had therapeutic abortions—a rate comparable to
that in the general population. Increasingly more physicians performed pregnancy tests before prescribing the
drug. Since 1988, approximately 20% of the women considered for Accutane treatment using the program kit
had been disqualiﬁed.70 The September 1991 issue of FDA Consumer announced that the Pregnancy Prevention
Program “appears to be working.”71
15With that, Accutane fell out of the public eye and oﬀ of FDA’s agenda. There would be no more Dermatologic
Drug Advisory Committee meetings dedicated to Accutane in the 1990s. In 1995, the New England Journal
of Medicine published the results of the Slone survey which seemed to suggest that the Pregnancy Prevention
Program had succeeded. Just 402 of the 120,000 women who participated in the survey reported pregnancy.
The survey tracked only about half of all women using the Accutane; consequently it could not be considered
conclusive.72 Nonetheless, an editorial published alongside the article remarked that it provided “some encour-
aging news.”73 It seemed the problem of Accutane babies would soon be over. Journalists and regulators turned
their attention elsewhere.
Quieter Conﬂicts: 1992-1999
Out of the spotlight, Hoﬀmann-La Roche continued to grapple with the repercussions of Accutane related birth
defects. By the mid 1990s, Accutane had earned the company a signiﬁcant list of enemies, many of whom were
looking to draw blood. Frank Yoder, in some ways a patron Saint of Hoﬀmann-La Roche—after all, his 1976
discovery had resulted in a tremendous money maker for the company—had spent the past ﬁfteen years insulting
Roche in the Washington Post. A subset of the plaintiﬀ’s bar called the Accutane Litigation Group had also
been chipping away at Hoﬀmann-La Roche. The company had settled a number of expensive lawsuits. But each
time documents were sealed, which meant new plaintiﬀs would have to start from scratch. The plaintiﬀ’s bar
had become convinced that Hoﬀmann-La Roche had acted recklessly—something which might entitle clients to
steep punitive damages. And the advocacy group, Public Citizen had been complaining vocally about Accutane
since 1983. Over time, the group grew frustrated by FDA’s complacency and convinced of Roche’s culpability.
In 1996, each of these three adversaries brought Hoﬀmann-La Roche to court.
On January 12, 1996 Dr. Frank Yoder sponsored an advertisement in a Columbus, Ohio newspaper The Daily
16Reporter:
UNIQUE SEALED-BID AUCTION
The entire private collection of Frank W. Yoder M.D. regarding the development, use and misuse
of ISOTRETINOIN (Accutane) will be sold by a sealed-bid auction.
This sale includes documents relating to the original protocol, letters from European
investigators, and a never before distributed or published manuscript titled, Isotretinoin Birth
Defects—A Preventable Tragedy.
Individuals, corporations and all other serious parties are invited to participate in this unique and
one time event. The minimum bid is $9.5 million dollars (U.S. Currency) and 20% of the net
proceeds will be designated for the prevention of birth defects.
On February 11, a similar advertisement appeared in the Washington Post.74
Roche promptly responded with service of process. The company sued Yoder in federal court, demanding an
injunction against the auction and replevin of the documents up for sale. “Most of the documents involve trade-
secret details of research and testing Hoﬀmann-La Roche performed before the drug was approved by the FDA
for sale to the public,” Roche’s attorney Karl Seib said. “These trade secrets would be extremely valuable to
Hoﬀmann-La Roche’s competitors.” Seib claimed that Yoder was trying to “intimidate and... threaten” the
company into purchasing the material. (Yoder had called representatives from Roche to inform them of his
auction several days before running the ad.)75 Yoder argued that the material did not concern trade secrets, but
rather Roche’s culpability in cases of Accutane-related birth defects. In his brief for the court, Yoder’s attorney
wrote ”Dr. Yoder’s assemblage of information is unique in that it provides a road map to Roche’s negligence
and greed in the early marketing of Accutane. Such information is admittedly valuable to victims of Roche’s
inadequate early warnings.”76
74Quoted in Hoﬀmann-La Roche v. Yoder, 950 F. Supp. at 1351.
75Quoted in Robert Ruth, Battle Opens Over Acne Drug Documents, Westerville Doctor Says Public Was Misled, Columbus
Dispatch, Mar. 21, 1996, at 1A.
76Jill Riepenhoﬀ and Robert Ruth, Drug Firm Hid Accutane Data From FDA, Court Papers Say, Columbus Dispatch, Apr. 1, 1996,
at 1A.
17Roche attorneys also appeared in another Ohio court in attempt to keep documents concealed from the plaintiﬀs’
attorneys. In 1994, the Fetterolfs had ﬁled suit against Hoﬀmann-La Roche for claims arising out of their son’s
Accutane-related birth defects. The Fetterolfs’ attorneys had reviewed nearly 40,000 documents at Hoﬀmann-La
Roche’s New Jersey oﬃces. On April 29, 1996 the plaintiﬀs petitioned the court to remove a protective order for
an additional 9,000 documents. The plaintiﬀs suspected that the company had withheld information: they had
been unable to ﬁnd any correspondence between Hoﬀmann-La Roche employees in the United States and those
who worked at the parent company in Switzerland. The plaintiﬀs supposed that the drug had caused birth defects
during testing in Switzerland and that Roche had withheld the information from FDA and researchers in the U.S.
Frank Yoder echoed this allegation when he testiﬁed in his own case on April 24th; he claimed that European
trials of Accutane had been halted when they resulted in serious birth defects.77
According to a Roche spokeswoman, the Company did not know for sure that Accutane caused birth defects until
the ﬁrst cases were reported in June of 1983. The chemical that Accutane is derived from, “has been known to
be a teratogen since the ‘60s,” the spokeswoman said, “That’s why it was labeled category X when we launched.
And that’s why there were all of the stringent requirements during the trials.”78
Roche representatives testiﬁed that they’d refused access to the 9,000 documents because the Fetterolfs would
not sign a protective order. Hoﬀmann-La Roche maintained that the order was necessary to protect the company’s
trade secrets. But unlike the victims who had preceded them, the Fetterolfs refused:
Hoﬀmann-La Roche has already been permitted to cause irreparable harm to many children by
virtue of the tactics it employs to prevent dissemination of the truth. The consuming public
is entitled to the truth, and (we) would urge this court to remove the cloak of secrecy which
(Hoﬀmann-La Roche) attempts to hide behind.79
The fate of Roche’s secret documents would ultimately be decided by a third court in New Jersey. In 1986, the
parents of Marvin Hammock sued Roche for Marvin’s Accutane-induced deformities. When the parties settled
77Jill Riepenhoﬀ and Mark D. Somerson, Accutane Legal Fight Resumes, Columbus Dispatch, Apr. 24, 1996, at 1B.
78Somerson and Riepenhoﬀ, supra note 22.
18the documents obtained by the Hammocks during discovery were sealed at the request of Roche. Public Citizen,
intervened in the case challenging the decision to seal the documents. Initially, the Superior Court granted
summary judgment to Roche. The case visited the appellate and trial courts twice more before arriving at the
New Jersey Supreme Court. That Court highlighted the longstanding public policy of public access to information
about health, safety and welfare, and held that the documents should be released unless Roche could show good
cause for denying access to the public.80 On May 9,1996 the Hudson County Superior Court ordered the material
unsealed. In announcing his decision to grant public access, Judge Gallipoli remarked, “Quite frankly... I don’t
think these documents amount to a hill of beans.”81
Judge Gallipoli’s assessment proved true: the documents did not provide the smoking gun that Public Citizen
and plaintiﬀs’ attorneys had expected. Records showed that within a year of releasing the drug to the market,
company oﬃcials became extremely nervous about Accutane-related birth defects and that the ﬁrst Accutane
baby was born on April 29, 1983. A memorandum documented a telephone conversation between John Burns,
vice president of research for Roche and Dr. Oakley at CDC: “Burns told Oakley that Roche would recommend
that any woman exposed to Accutane during pregnancy have an elective abortion.” In addition, the papers showed
for the ﬁrst time that Roche had submitted Accutane with a pregnancy risk rating of C, and that it had been FDA
who insisted on upping the warning level. But the documents contained no evidence of communications between
the New Jersey oﬃces and researchers in Europe.82
The following January, when Yoder won his legal battle, his $9.5 million documents proved equally disappointing.83
80Hammock v. Hoﬀmann-La Roche, 622 A.2d 546.
81Quoted in Jill Riepenhoﬀ, Judge: Acutane Documents Must Be Opened, Columbus Dispatch, May 10, 1996 at 3C.
82Documents described in Riepenhoﬀ and Somerson, supra note 24.
83Hoﬀmann-La Roche v. Yoder, 950 F. Supp. 1348. The court concluded that Yoder’s materials were not protected trade secrets,
in part relying on the New Jersey court’s order in Hammock. Because the material was publicly available it could not constitute a
19Nothing in Yoder’s collection provided concrete proof of Accutane babies born prior to 1983.84
The most interesting material to surface during this period came from an Ohio newspaper, the Columbus Dispatch.
The Dispatch was the only major publication that covered the series of Accutane-related lawsuits in 1996. As
a result of Yoder’s allegations, two reporters, Mark Somerson and Jill Riepenhoﬀ, began their own investigation
into the development and early marketing of Accutane.
The two were the ﬁrst to report the confusion over who ﬁrst discovered Accutane’s ability to treat severe acne.
Dr. Werner Bollag’s role in the drug’s history had been known since the 1983 publication of his article in Retinoids
Therapy, but those who considered the subject wondered why Hoﬀmann-La Roche suddenly decided to reconsider
Accutane as an acne treatment in 1975—four years after Bollag dropped his project. For example, Diane Nygaard
chair of the Accutane Litigation Group had described Roche’s decision to resume testing as “inexplicable.”85
Somerson and Riepenhoﬀ uncovered part of an explanation: the company began testing again after Yoder and
Peck independently realized that the drug could be used to treat acne and reported their success.
In addition, documents obtained through a Freedom of Information Act claim ﬁled by Somerson reveal the extent
to which Accutane had become a source of tension for FDA. Several members of FDA felt the agency should take
a stronger position against Hoﬀmann-La Roche. David Graham, one of the authors of the controversial Michigan
Medicaid study, criticized Roche’s proposed labeling change in October 1988. The company had revised the label
secret. In addition Roche’s failure to obtain a conﬁdentiality agreement from Yoder in the 1970s undercut the company’s claim.
84In my research, I could not ﬁnd any information about what Yoder did with his documents after winning his case. I did, however,
make contact with Mark Somerson, one of the reporters who covered the story for the Dispatch. Having reviewed the ﬁles, Somerson
commented that the collection did not contain “one memo or note that would show that the company knew that the drug caused
birth defects.” Email from Mark Somerson, Assistant State Editor, Columbus Dispatch, to Julia Green (Mar. 7, 2002, 15:37 EST)(on
ﬁle with recipient).
85Nygaard, supra note 17, at 81.
20to read, “potentially all fetuses may be aﬀected,” and “physicians and patients should discuss the desirability of
continuing the pregnancy.” Graham suggested that Roche intentionally overstated the risk of birth defects. ”The
eﬀect communicated by this wording to the patient and her physician is that there is virtually a 100 percent risk of
severe birth defect and that induced abortion should be performed.” According to Somerson’s report, four doctors
at FDA who tracked Accutane echoed Graham’s concern: ”Current product labeling serves Roche interests by
reducing the number of women who deliver, and this reduces the probability that FDA will ever be informed of
the exposure, because of massive underreporting.... The ﬁrm has not acted in good faith to truly and accurately
answer questions relating to Accutane use in women and pregnancy exposure.” Others at the agency felt it was
important to convey a signiﬁcant risk and that exposed fetuses should be aborted. 86
Somerson’s report also portrays more explicit disputes within the agency. On May 8, 1989 a member of the
Dermatologic Drugs Advisory Committee accused Graham of using “Nazi methods of decision-making” about
Accutane. Meanwhile, Graham criticized the regulatory structure used by FDA.
It is troubling to realize the extreme lack of impartiality which characterizes this committee...
Dermatologists prescribe the vast majority of (Accutane), and much of the problem with (Ac-
cutane) relates to its widespread use beyond the labeled indication.... It goes beyond normal
expectations to believe that a committee of dermatologists would ﬁnd fault with its own profes-
sion, or recommend that (Accutane) be removed from the market as an imminent hazard.... In
this sense, presenting (Accutane) to the dermatology committee is somewhat akin to the notion
of the fox in the henhouse.
For some members of FDA, the problem of Accutane-induced birth defects had presented fundamental
questions about the agency’s regulatory methods.87
But the reporters were unable to uncover proof of Roche’s actual knowledge of Accutane-induced birth defects
86Mark D. Somerson, Memos Bare FDA Split Over Accutane, Columbus Dispatch, Jul. 14 1996, at 7C.
87Id.
21prior to 1983. Eventually, Somerson and Riepenhoﬀ abandoned their investigation. 88
Although Frank Yoder, Public Citizen, the Accutane Litigation Group and the Columbus Dispatch all failed to
produce evidence establishing Hoﬀmann-La Roche had withheld data from FDA, the ordeal did uncover some
questionable behavior. Why would Hoﬀmann-La Roche propose a pregnancy risk rating of only C for a product
so dangerous that the initial investigator abandoned it? And why hadn’t the company shared information about
the earlier research with scientists in the U.S. studying the drug in 1975? Research done by the Dispatch could
also raise concerns about FDA. Had FDA catered to the manufacturer instead of protecting the public? Or were
a few members—obsessed by some sort of personal vendetta—stirring up unnecessary conﬂict at the agency?
The information uncovered never congealed into enough of a story to attract mainstream attention. Outside Ohio,
most Americans remained unaware of Hoﬀmann-La Roche’s ongoing legal troubles. Consequently, the company
and FDA escaped scrutiny.
Regulation Resumed: 1999-2002
In the past few years, FDA and other government entities have revisited Accutane, questioning whether even
more should be done to protect against Accutane-induced birth defects. Although Roche’s Pregnancy Prevention
Program succeeded in maintaining a very low pregnancy rate (2.7 per 1000 women taking Accutane) the number
of patients taking Accutane steadily increased after 1991. Between 1992 and 1999, the number Accutane pre-
scriptions grew by 200%.89 Although the risk of exposed pregnancy for any individual woman taking Accutane
had decreased, the total number of Accutane babies remained constant because of increased use.
CDC signaled the renewed interest in Accutane babies on January 21, 2001 in Mortality and Morbidity Weekly Re-
88Somerson, supra note 84.
89Testimony from Dr. Amarilys Vega to the Dermatologic Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting, Sep. 18, 2000, available at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/accutane.htm.
22port.90 The item, “Accutane-Exposed Pregnancies –California, 1999,” described a series interviews that CDC had
conducted with 14 women in California who had recently reported Accutane-exposed pregnancies. The researchers
initiated the study in order to “draw attention to the continued occurrence” of Accutane-exposed pregnancies
and to “learn more about why these exposed pregnancies happened.”91
The study diagnosed several problems contributing to the exposures. Although all of the women interviewed
knew that Accutane should not be used during pregnancy, none reported having seen all the components of the
Pregnancy Prevention Program. Four women had not seen any of the educational material, aside from what was
printed on the package. Most of the women interviewed did not use two forms of birth control—eight had not
used contraception at all when the pregnancy occurred. And only ten women took pregnancy tests before taking
Accutane. The study highlighted that doctors continued to ignore many of the requirements of the Pregnancy
Prevention Program.92
The CDC report also underlined the problem of overuse. At least half of the respondents reported that they did
not have the severe, recalcitrant, nodular acne for which the drug is indicated. One woman described taking
Accutane one week each month to prevent oily skin during her period. In part, the researchers linked increase use
of the drug to advertising. Four of the respondents stated that commercials had contributed to their decisions to
see a doctor.93
Within two months, Hoﬀmann-La Roche announced a new intervention, the Targeted Pregnancy Prevention Pro-
gram, which would be geared toward the 0.27% of women who had fallen through the cracks of the previous
eﬀorts. The program consisted of a new batch of labeling changes; for example, two pregnancy tests should
be timed according to instructions and performed before starting therapy; doctors should call pharmacists with
90Accutane-Exposed Pregnancies—California, 1999, 49 CDC MMWR Weekly 28 (2002).
91Id. at 28.
92Id.
93Id. Hoﬀmann-La Roche began direct-to-consumer print advertising in 1996 and added television and radio advertisements in
1997.
23prescriptions (as opposed to handing written prescriptions to patients); and two safe and eﬀective methods of
birth control should be used. FDA approved the new label in May. Roche also planned to distribute educational
packets for patients titled “Be Smart, Be Safe, Be Sure,” and to organize Continuing Medical Education classes
for doctors who prescribed the drug. A video would be distributed for doctors to show patients about the risks,
and Roche would reiterate the importance of monthly pregnancy testing and counseling. That spring, Roche
distributed pregnancy tests to all doctors known to prescribe Accutane. The educational video for went out in
June. And in July Roche began visiting individual prescribers to do oﬃce training.94
On September 18, 2000 FDA called on the Dermatologic Drugs Advisory Committee for advice about Accutane.
FDA’s Dr. Jonca Bull posed the question to the Committee. “From a risk management standpoint, can we in
our mission to ensure the safe and eﬀective use of drug products, given societal and regulatory realities, develop
a framework that further reduces the known risk of teratogenicity attendant to the use of (Accutane.)” FDA
asked the panel to consider which risk management tools should be used for Accutane and what next steps should
be taken, if any, if improved risk management is not realized. The committee was to reﬂect on a variety of
mechanisms—increased risk communication, modiﬁed packaging, restricted distribution, mandatory monitoring
of patients, and improved informed consent—and formulate a general recommendation for FDA. 95
Hoﬀmann-La Roche presented data to the Committee suggesting that education would be the best way to reduce
pregnancy. Roche had knowledge of 1,995 cases of pregnancy exposures to Accutane, 70% of which occurred
after the initiation of the Pregnancy Prevention Program. Of those women an estimated 61% had been using
only one form of contraception and 34% had failed to use contraception. 14% of the women were unknowingly
pregnant at the initial visit with the doctor. This reﬂected a need for more information about the importance of
multiple forms of birth control and pregnancy testing. Roche also presented ﬁgures that showed many doctors had
94Testimony from Eileen Leach to the Dermatologic Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting, Sep. 18, 2000, available at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/accutane.htm.
95Testimony from Jonca Bull to the Dermatologic Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting, Sep. 18, 2000, available at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/accutane.htm.
24failed to comply with the Pregnancy Prevention Program, prescribing the drug without ﬁrst testing for pregnancy
or obtaining a signed informed consent. Presumably, outreach eﬀorts could achieve improved doctor participation
and fewer pregnancies.96
The Committee also listened to the usual information about the dangers of Accutane exposure during pregnancy
and about the drug’s unique ability to cure acne. Dr. Lammer, one of the participants in CDC’s 1999 Study,
commented, “In terms of medications, in terms of the magnitude of risk and the severity of malformations, this
drug is really unique.” Dr. Barbara Reed, a member of the Board of the American Academy of Dermatology,
described the risks associated with acne: “There is no single disease which causes more psychic trauma, more
maladjustment between parents and children, more general insecurity and feelings of inferiority and greater sums
of psychic suﬀering than does acne.” It was a battle of superlatives. 97
A representative of Celgene, the U.S. manufacturer of Thalidomide, described the program that had been im-
plemented with the release of that drug in 1998. Under the System for Thalidomide Education and Prescribing
Safety (STEPS), Celgene required doctors and pharmacies to register with the company to prescribe or dispense
the drug. In addition, all patients participated in a mandatory survey tracking their Thalidomide use. At that time,
about 10,500 pharmacies and 900 doctors had enrolled in the program. Representatives from the Thalidomide
Victims Association of Canada, the Organization of Teratology Information Services, the March of Dimes, and
Public Citizen each pointed to STEPS asking the Committee require Roche to implement a similar program and
restrict access to the drug. A representative from FDA’s oﬃce of Postmarketing Drug Risk Assessment bolstered
their case by belittling Roche’s proposals; healthcare providers were not “lacking for the information or access
into the information. It’s putting it into practice that’s the problem.”98
Dermatologists voiced objections to restricted access programs. Dr. Reed suggested that the system would disrupt




25the doctor-patient relationship and force patients to ﬁnd new doctors just to start a new treatment. Compelling
patients to discuss sex and pregnancy with an unfamiliar doctor would undermine education eﬀorts. Patients in
rural communities might have to travel long distances to get needed care. Another dermatologist complained
that the suggestion intruded too far into the profession, “As an individual practitioner, it was my decision that
this patient be treated with Accutane, and it should remain my decision and not that of the manufacturer or
pharmacist, or anyone else.... I am convinced that education... is the way to accomplish this.”99
The committee voted for a form of restricted access. In addition to increasing educational eﬀorts, as Roche
suggested, the Pregnancy Prevention Program should be modiﬁed: all prescriptions should be limited to 30 day-
supplies, and before dispensing Accutane, pharmacists should have to conﬁrm that a negative pregnancy test
has been documented. For women taking the drug, registration in the Program should be mandatory as should
participation in the Slone survey. (Previously, participation in the survey had been voluntary, and Committee
members worried that the data were inaccurate.) The Committee also recommended that Roche be required to
conduct independent surveillance to identify pregnancy exposures.100
In a Dear Doctor letter, dated January 9, 2001, FDA announced that educational eﬀorts had not succeeded in
eliminating Accutane-exposed pregnancies: “... human memory is not an adequate precaution for managing se-
vere risk.” The Committee had recommended “additional systematized measures to manage risk and fully inform
patients.” FDA stated that it was working closely with Roche to address the recommendations that were made
by the advisory committee.101
Nine months later, in October 2001, FDA revealed SMART (the System to Manage Accutane Related Terato-
genicity). The new program, which takes eﬀect on April 10, 2002 will require prescribers to study the SMART
“Guide to Best Practices,” provided by Roche and then send a signed “Letter of Understanding” to the company
99Id.
100Kenneth Lyons Jones, Jane Adams, Christina Chambers, J. David Erickson, Edward Lammer and Janine Polifka, Isotretinoin and
Pregnancy, 285 JAMA 2081 (2001).
101Letter from Janet Woodcock, Center Director, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research to Health Care Providers (Jan. 9, 2001)
available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/accutane/accutane-ltr.htm.
26certifying knowledge of how to prevent fetal exposure. Upon receipt of the letter, Roche will send prescribers
yellow qualiﬁcation stickers. All prescriptions for Accutane should have attached a special yellow sticker, which
indicates that the patient has had a negative pregnancy test and counseling about pregnancy prevention. The
pregnancy test will be repeated every month before a new prescription is provided. Pharmacists will only be
permitted to ﬁll prescriptions that have the yellow sticker. In addition, all female patients must be given the
opportunity to participate in the Slone survey. Participation will not be mandatory.102
It remains to be seen whether SMART will accomplish the goal of eliminating the tragedy of Accutane babies.
Clearly, the program was designed as a compromise between the desire for European-styled programs which achieve
very low rates of pregnancy exposure by strictly limiting access, and the conﬂicting goal of easy availability of
medicine to those who need it. But, while the program may look like a form of restricted access—after all,
only doctors with special yellow stickers can prescribe the drug—in actuality the new protections more serve as
hoops to jump through than barriers to access. Any doctor can send in a Letter of Understanding and obtain
the stickers; qualiﬁcation is not limited to dermatologists or other healthcare providers with special training. And
like the Letter of Understanding, the sticker itself amounts to nothing more than a statement by a doctor of
self-certiﬁcation. Conspicuously absent from SMART are any interventions designed to address the problem of
overuse. The yellow sticker signiﬁes that a patient has received pregnancy tests and counseling, not that a patient
has severe cystic acne. Clearly, SMART caters to the concerns expressed by dermatologists at the September
2000 meeting: whether or not a patient obtains a prescription to Accutane remains almost entirely in the control
of the physician.
A few modiﬁcations might have given this certiﬁcation-based form of restricted access more teeth. For one, Roche
might have made its half-day continuing medical education class a mandatory prerequisite for certiﬁcation instead
of a recommended event. In that way, the company would have ensured that doctors who receive stickers actually
102FDA Talk Paper, FDA, FDA Announces Changes to the Risk Management Program to Prevent Birth Defects Caused by Accutane
(Oct. 31, 2001) available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/2001/ANS01113.html.
27have been informed of the best practices. Similarly, FDA might have followed the Committee’s recommendation
and required actual documentation of two negative pregnancy tests—instead of just a yellow sticker. Then it
would have been impossible for a doctor to prescribe the drug if he forgot to perform a pregnancy test. In order
to write a prescription without performing two tests, a doctor would have to actively forge the documentation.
At very least, FDA might have included a diagnosis of severe, recalcitrant acne as one of the preconditions for
using the yellow sticker; this would have sent a clear message that Accutane was not appropriate for oﬀ-label use.
As it stands, doctors are their own gatekeepers, and their judgment and neglect remain unchecked.
That said, SMART clearly provides some added value to the existing system. Presumably, many doctors will
actually read the Guide to Best Practices before submitting the letters and will beneﬁt from the increased edu-
cation. In addition the yellow stickers might serve as a reminder, triggering doctors to perform pregnancy tests
and provide counseling. Taken together the yellow stickers and letter of certiﬁcation might be interpreted as a
contract, and doctors who use the stickers without the requisite protections might be liable for their actions.103
Or perhaps the yellow stickers will form the basis for malpractice liability. The precautions signiﬁed by the sticker
suggest a clear standard of care required for the profession. Maybe the specter of the litigation that might arise
from misuse of the stickers will be enough to scare doctors into compliance. More generally, the very fact of
such a novel program will undoubtedly convey the message that Accutane poses serious risks and should not be
prescribed casually.104 Over the next few months, we will discover whether this mild form of restricted access
proves enough to capture the remaining pregnancy exposures.
103To succeed under this theory, plaintiﬀs would have to establish that they had been intended as third party beneﬁciaries of the
contract with Hoﬀmann-La Roche, and consequently should be entitled to sue.
104See generally Risk Management of Accutane, 287 JAMA 578 (2002) (“alerting physicians to the strengthened risk management
program for isotretinoin”).
28A Brief Sidebar: Accutane Linked to Suicide?
The primary focus of future of Accutane regulation may be mental illness. As of December 31, 2001, 140 Accutane
users worldwide (94 in the U.S.) have killed themselves while taking Accutane or within a few months of stopping
treatment. Another 257 patients have been hospitalized for severe depression or attempted suicide.105 Many
reported that the symptoms diminished or disappeared after stopping Accutane treatment; several patients found
that when they resumed taking the drug, depression returned. Accutane ranks among the top 10 drugs in FDA’s
database with respect to depression and suicide reports.106 But the number of reported cases among Accutane
users is actually no greater than that in the general population. About 6.1% of persons age15-24 have symptoms
of severe depression in any given month.107 And adolescents and young adults with severe acne may be particularly
prone to depression.108 This makes for a confusing situation: FDA has collected reports of patients who seem
to suﬀer from depression only while taking Accutane, but there is no increased prevalence of depression in the
overall population of users.
Perhaps because of its prior experiences, FDA has been quicker to require Hoﬀmann-La Roche warn about the
possibility of depression and suicide, even in the absence of clear evidence. In June 1985 when FDA mandated
a black box warning for Accutane, depression was included as one of the possible side eﬀects that had been
reported.109 In 1997, based on case reports of serious psychiatric disorders, FDA approached Hoﬀmann-La Roche
about heightening the warning. On February 24, 1998 Roche released a new label. The warning began:
105Duenwald, supra note 9.
106Diane k. Wysowski, Marilyn Pitts and Julie Beitz, Depression and Suicide in Patients Treated with Isotretinoin, 344 New Eng.
J. Med. 460 (2001).
107Acne Drug Depression Warnings Highlight Need for Expert Care, supra note 7, at 1057.
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29Psychiatric Disorders: Accutane may cause depression, psychosis and rarely, suicidal ideation,
suicide attempts and suicide. Discontinuation of Accutane therapy may be insuﬃcient; further
evaluation may be necessary. No mechanism of action has been established for these events.110
A month later, the United Kingdom required a similar warning. According to FDA, doctors should simply act as
if Accutane causes suicide.111
More recently, FDA and Hoﬀmann-La Roche have taken steps aimed directly at informing patients. In March
2001, Hoﬀmann-La Roche published a medication guide that explains the possible association between suicide and
Accutane to patients. The company also unveiled a new informed consent form, which describes the concern about
suicide and requires patients inform their doctors of any history of mental illness. 112 At monthly visits, doctors
should check for signs of depression. This spring the company will send out a new brochure to dermatologists
and other prescribing physicians instructing them how to recognize early signs of depression.113
But Hoﬀmann-La Roche has also indicated a familiar reluctance to disclose information. Only in July 1998, 14
months after FDA ﬁrst approached Hoﬀmann-La Roche about adding suicide to the warning label, did the agency
discover that a French study from 1994 showed an association between Accutane and depression. In March 1997,
Roche had added “suicide attempt” to the warning label for Accutane sold in France. Hoﬀmann-La Roche never
shared the information with FDA.114
In addition, Roche’s marketing demonstrated an insensitivity to the suicide concern. In 1998, about the same time
that FDA required the risk of suicide appear on the label, Roche released a new advertisement for Accutane which
included the following statement: “Eﬀective treatment of severe recalcitrant nodular acne minimizes progressive
physical scarring, as well as negative psychosocial eﬀects such as depression and poor self image.” On March
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Research).
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305, 1998, FDA sent a warning letter to the company demanding the advertisement be pulled. According to
the agency, “Statements in Roche’s promotional materials that Accutane therapy will minimize or improve the
patient’s psychological status, including depression, are false or misleading and promote an unapproved use.”115
And like Accutane-induced birth defects, cases of suicide and depression have generated new adversaries for
Hoﬀmann-La Roche—adversaries driven to take action. The international organization, “Roaccutane/Accutane
Action Group,” formed in January, 1999. On its website the group describes the mission:
To demand the appointment of an independent national and coordinated international investi-
gation into Accutane/Roaccutane and the manufacturers of the drug, it’s executives and key
employees, concerning lack of safety standards, inadequate label warnings, knowledge of side
eﬀects concealed at launch of product, accuracy or inaccuracy of results disclosed in pre-trial
studies, alteration and manipulation of data on side eﬀects, applied by the manufacturers Roche
from 1982 to date.116
One ally of the group is Michigan Congressman Bart Stupak. On May 14, 2000, Stupak’s 17 year-old son B.J.
shot himself to death. B.J. had used Accutane, and a few weeks after his death the Stupaks discovered the link to
depression. Since then, Bart Stupak has worked hard to publicize what he calls “spontaneous suicides,” suicides
in seemingly happy people who take Accutane.117 Shortly after B.J.’s death, Stupak told his story on NBC’s
“Today Show.”118 In addition, Stupak used his political position to pressure FDA and Hoﬀmann-La Roche to
increase regulation of the Drug. It was Stupak who pushed the company to create an informed consent form and
medication guide for patients; on Stupak’s urging Hoﬀmann-La Roche also terminated advertisements aimed at
minors.119
Stupak’s case put Accutane on the Congressional agenda; on December 5, 2000, the House Committee on Gov-
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31ernment Reform held a meeting, “Acne Drug Accutane & It’s Alleged Links to Depression and Suicide.” The
Committee heard testimony from parents of teenagers who committed suicide while taking Accutane. Repre-
sentatives from FDA, Hoﬀmann-La Roche, and the American Academy of Dermatology also participated.120 A
Congressional hearing was scheduled for October 2001 to probe whether Hoﬀmann-La Roche and FDA gave
consumers adequate warnings about suicide. Congress postponed the hearing after September 11th.121
But in the aftermath of September 11th, one particular case brought the association between Accutane and suicide
back into the spotlight. On January 5th, 2002 15-year-old Charles Bishop ﬂew a small plane into an oﬃce build-
ing in Tampa, Florida. Investigators soon discovered a prescription for Accutane among Bishop’s belongings.122
Toxicology tests by the medical examiner found no Accutane in his blood, but his mother reported that Charles
had taken the drug. Mrs. Bishop argued that Accutane might be responsible for her son’s behavior.123 The
copy-cat crime, coupled with a suicide note expressing sympathy for terrorists, garnered immediate coverage from
all news media; newspapers throughout the country reported the association between Accutane and suicide.124
According to an analyst quoted in the New Jersey Record, Accutane sales have dropped by ten percent since 2000
because of increased publicity of Accutane-linked suicides.125 Undoubtedly, the association between Accutane
and depression will continue to pose a problem for Hoﬀmann-La Roche. The manufacturer and FDA continue to
struggle with this the highly publicized—but poorly understood—phenomenon.
Lessons to Learn
Without doubt, Accutane is a special drug, one that poses extraordinary challenges for FDA. Nonetheless, FDA’s
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32experience with Accutane highlights several structural weaknesses in the overall regulatory system. In addition,
Accutane’s impact extends beyond the patients who have taken it and the company that markets it. By pushing
FDA to devise new control techniques, Accutane left its mark on the agency. Although the drug itself remains
unique, the story of Accutane provides insight into drug regulation in the United States generally.
It is also worth noting how much of the story has been driven by circumstance. For example, the United
States’ relative eagerness to approve Accutane must be explained in part by our inexperience with Thalidomide.
Had more babies been deformed by Thalidomide—as they were in Europe—fewer would have been exposed to
Accutane. Happenstance, like the fact that one teen suicide invoked terrorism or that another was the son of a
Congressman, earned tremendous publicity for the potential association between Accutane and depression. Bart
Stupak’s position in the House of Representatives enabled him to eﬀect marketing changes within a week. And
politics have inﬂuenced regulation in other ways as well. For example, the controversy surrounding Accutane in
the eighties in part derived from the product’s relationship to abortion, a politically sensitive issue. In considering
where to point ﬁngers in the Accutane story, we should remember that some portions must be owed to fortuity.
If we conceive of FDA as a safety net designed to protect consumers, then perhaps Accutane babies might be
said to have fallen through the holes. The story of Accutane exposes many of FDA’s vulnerabilities. For one,
FDA has no authority over doctors or patients, the two groups who ultimately control whether a fetus will be
exposed to Accutane. A clear conclusion to be drawn from this story is that Dear Doctor letters and warnings
on labels do not eﬀect signiﬁcant change on the part of healthcare practitioners. This inability to control directly
the gatekeepers to prescription drugs poses a real limitation for the agency. Products whose safety depends on
behavioral practices will inevitably reach beyond the scope of FDA.
The story also raises fundamental concerns about the advisory committee system put in place by FDA. Are
the doctors who would use a particular drug well-suited to decide whether it should be allowed on the market?
Accutane provides revenue not only for Hoﬀmann-La Roche but also for the doctors prescribing it, most of whom
33are dermatologists. (Each of the ﬁve million Americans who have used Accutane visited a doctor to obtain a
prescription.) FDA might consider whether the value added by specialists’ relative expertise is oﬀset by this
conﬂict of interest.
In addition, the story exposes the limitations of liberalism, in particular the idea that educated consumers should
be free to make their own choices—and to suﬀer the consequences. Accutane’s dangers cannot satisfactorily be
addressed through consumer warnings: the victims of Accutane, unborn babies, cannot participate in informed
consent. When choices and consequences are not experienced by the same individual, the model no longer makes
sense. Regulatory tools aimed at increasing information may not be adequate protections for third party victims.
The Accutane story might be deemed either a triumph or a failure. In public health terms, FDA and Roche have
succeeded in achieving tremendous change. As compared to the general population, the pregnancy rate of 0.27%
in Accutane users is extremely low. A country, such as ours, that has been unable to eﬀect simple behavioral
modiﬁcations, such as ﬂossing, must admire the accomplishment. On the other hand, FDA’s regulations and
Roche’s own interventions have collectively been unable to eliminate Accutane babies. Accutane-induced birth
defects remain a preventable tragedy.
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